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find are two brief discussions on pages 144 and 
152.) Because so many of the analyses consider 
how outcomes are correlated with 
employer 
"fixed effects" on workers' earnings, the book 
would have been stronger with an additional 
appendix detailing how these earnings effects 
are estimated, and discussing how these estima 
tion procedures constrain the bounds within 
which the effects can be interpreted. 
Part of the issue is that the estimation of 
employer effects and person effects on earnings 
is only identified by the persons who switch 
employer. With only a few years of data for each 
person, there is substantial measurement error 
in 
estimating person fixed effects. In addition, 
the specification used to estimate person and 
employer fixed effects on earnings levels does 
not allow for person and employer effects on 
earnings growth, which are plausible. As a 
result, what is estimated to be an employer fixed 
effect on earnings levels may in part reflect the 
kinds of workers the employer hires. For ex 
ample, an employer may tend to hire workers 
whose true person fixed effects on earnings 
levels are higher than these workers' measured 
person fixed effects, or workers whose earnings 
growth trends are greater than the average 
person's growth rate trend. 
The policy discussion also could have more 
fully explored some of the limitations of what 
can be inferred from these estimates. Even if 
the estimates do reflect causal effects of em 
ployer characteristics, the average effects of 
employer characteristics on workers' success 
under current labor market policy need not 
reflect the 
marginal effects under policies that 
change how workers are placed in jobs. For 
example, in research completed after this book 
was written, David Autor and Susan Houseman 
found that welfare clients, if they are essentially 
randomly assigned to welfare-to-work agencies 
that tend to place more welfare clients in tem 
porary jobs, have lower earnings later on ("Do 
Temporary Help Jobs Improve Labor Market 
Outcomes for Low-Skilled Workers?" Working 
Paper 11743, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, November 2005). Autor and 
Houseman's results may not contradict the re 
sults 
reported in AHL's book. Low-earnings 
workers who are currently placed in temporary 
jobs may on average experience a long-run ben 
efit, but the marginal additional individuals 
placed in temporary jobs by policy variations 
may not. 
However, these are modest caveats regarding 
a 
unique book that should spark needed future 
research. Andersson, H?lzer, and Lane persua 
sively argue that employers matter in the suc 
cess of low-earnings workers. As the book points 
out, this finding should lead to more research 
to figure out the specific mechanisms that ex 
plain why and how employers matter. And it 
should lead to exploring a wide variety of poli 
cies to see if we can alter the distribution of 
opportunities offered by employers to low-earn 
ings workers. Some of these policies might fail, 
but continued efforts to work with employers 
are likely to be fruitful for both research and 
policy regarding low-earnings workers. 
Timothy J. Bartik 
Senior Economist 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research 
The Mismanagement of Talent: Employability 
and Jobs in the Knowledge Economy. By Phillip 
Brown and Anthony Hesketh. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. x, 278 pp. 
ISBN 0-19-92-6953-X, $39.95 (paper); 978 
0-19-92-6954-9, $124.50 (cloth). 
A 1997 landmark study by McKinsey 8c Com 
pany exposed the "war for talent" as a strategic 
business challenge and key driver of company 
performance. Although the McKinsey consult 
ants were certainly not the first to note the shift 
toward a knowledge-based economy (KBE)? 
Peter Drucker predicted the rise of the knowl 
edge worker over a half-century ago?their re 
port has perhaps done most to promulgate the 
"war for talent" perspective and the view that 
companies that are victorious on this battlefield 
will be those that realize competitive advantage 
in the KBE. 
In The Mismanagement of Talent, Brown and 
Hesketh argue that rooted within the dominant 
discourse of the "war for talent" are several core 
assumptions that have shaped our perspective 
on 
employability in the KBE. The most central 
of these is that there is a limited pool of talent 
capable of rising to senior managerial posi 
tions, which creates fierce competition to re 
cruit the best and brightest. The perception of 
talent as a limited commodity is seen as driving 
organizations to diversify their talent pools and 
adopt more rigorous recruitment and selection 
tools in an effort to get the right people, with 
the right knowledge, into the right jobs. That 
perception also shapes public policy, as govern 
ments focus on expanding access to higher 
education and dismantling barriers to talent 
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presented by fundamental forms of inequal 
ity so that their work forces are positioned to 
compete in the global economy. Also af 
fected are future knowledge workers them 
selves, who are pushed to acquire the employ 
ability skills that will ostensibly guarantee 
them the high-skilled, high-wage jobs gener 
ated within the KBE. 
In the first 
chapter-and-a-half, the authors 
outline those core assumptions. The remain 
der of the book is dedicated to challenging this 
"consensus view" of the "war for talent" and 
exposing what the authors believe are serious 
problems in how companies recruit the manag 
ers and leaders of the future and manage their 
human 
capital, how government is adjusting 
(or failing to adjust) to the realities of the KBE, 
and how future knowledge workers are trying to 
manage their employability in the competition 
for fast-track management positions. The book 
draws heavily on the authors' fieldwork, which 
consists of 15 interviews with 
representatives of 
private and public sector organizations, 10 in 
terviews with policy stakeholders, and observa 
tions of assessment center processes within 6 
organizations. In addition, the authors inte 
grate evidence from interviews with 60 college 
and 
university graduates who were applicants to 
the organizations under investigation. Although 
the authors' own work is limited to organiza 
tions and students within the United Kingdom, 
they adduce employment data from the United 
States.as evidence that their findings and con 
clusions transcend geographical boundaries. 
At the heart of this volume lies the authors' 
macro 
analysis of the KBE. Brown and Hesketh 
challenge positional consensus theory, accord 
ing to which the key challenge in the modern 
economy is ensuring that individuals have the 
employability skills to take advantage of high 
skilled, high-wage job opportunities. They ar 
gue that this consensus view of employability 
ignores the realities of the occupational struc 
ture and the demand for knowledge workers 
in the KBE. In particular, they contend that 
managerial and professional jobs remain at a 
premium, which leads to positional conflict 
in which not everyone with the appropriate 
qualifications and skills can win because there 
are invariably far more applicants than job 
opportunities. 
In 
support of their position, Brown and 
Hesketh present occupational data suggesting 
that the U.K. and U.S. economies continue to 
be dominated by routine production and ser 
vice, rather than knowledge, occupations. This 
leads to the conclusion that job opportunities 
for knowledge workers are much more limited 
than the proponents of the KBE would have us 
believe. This is a central tenet of the authors' 
theory and one that serves as the foundation for 
their arguments in this book. 
I found the data and the authors' macro 
analysis of the current KBE convincing. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that several impor 
tant differences exist across the U.S. and U.K. 
datasets. Most 
notably, the U.S. data show a far 
higher proportion of workers engaged in ser 
vice occupations than in either knowledge or 
routine production occupations, whereas the 
U.K. data indicate a significantly higher propor 
tion of workers in knowledge and, particularly, 
routine production occupations than in service 
occupations. Further, there exist marked dif 
ferences across these datasets with respect to 
the projected growth in the proportion of knowl 
edge workers. Unfortunately, the authors do 
very little to help us make sense of these 
differences and their potential implications. 
Nonetheless, their macro analysis of the KBE 
raises thought-provoking questions regard 
ing the legitimacy of the "war for talent" and 
the employment prospects of future knowl 
edge workers. 
The focus of the book then shifts to under 
standing how companies define and approach 
managerial talent and leadership potential 
within the KBE. It is argued that many organi 
zations are locked into a "war for talent" that 
bears little 
relationship to the reality of the 
labor market. This focus on 
winning the talent 
war, however misplaced it might be, is seen as 
having numerous implications. Despite the 
rhetoric of organizational change and recruit 
ment for diversity, it is argued that many orga 
nizations have maintained an elitist view of 
managerial employability and have continued 
employing fast-track recruitment processes that 
fail to neutralize fundamental forms of injus 
tice. Brown and Hesketh suggest that the focus 
on 
recruiting individuals who demonstrate not 
only future potential but an ability to add imme 
diate value has led to difficult-to-define skill 
requirements. They conclude that as organiza 
tions attach greater importance to applicants' 
personal qualities, such as drive and initiative, 
the purported objectivity of modern recruit 
ment practices breaks down and leads to hiring 
decisions based on 
"gut feeling." This is a bold 
and controversial conclusion that needs to be 
evaluated 
cautiously given that it is based largely 
on observations of assessment centers in only a 
few (six) organizations. Future work is needed 
to 
expand the scope of this investigation and 
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critically evaluate such findings in the context 
of current recruitment and selection theory. 
Yet, this book does provide an interesting per 
spective on the potential forces driving the ho 
mogenization of talent in leading companies. 
Another thoroughly examined subject in this 
volume is how young knowledge workers so 
cially construct and manage their employabil 
ity. Through a series of interviews, the authors 
focus on 
assessing not only recent college and 
university graduates' expectations of finding 
well-paid and rewarding jobs but also the differ 
ent 
strategies employed by graduates in the 
competition for tough-entry jobs. This assess 
ment leads to the identification of two "ideal 
types" of graduates?Players and Purists. The 
Players understand employability as a positional 
game and market themselves in ways that con 
form to the 
requirements of employers. Alter 
natively, the Purists view the competition as a 
meritocratic race and focus on finding employ 
ment that offers the 
right fit with their knowl 
edge, skills, and aspirations. This analysis pro 
vides insight into how those at the top end of the 
labor market have 
responded to changes in 
employer requirements and the intense compe 
tition for top knowledge jobs. The authors also 
suggest that these differences between the Play 
ers and Purists highlight the ethical tension 
around the question of which routes to success 
are legitimate. One fertile ethics-related ques 
tion is whether Player behavior leads to com 
petitive advantage in the quest for top knowl 
edge jobs. 
Overall, The Mismanagement ofTalentpresents 
a 
compelling alternative view of the "war for 
talent." Brown and Hesketh unabashedly chal 
lenge the dominant discourse of the knowl 
edge-driven economy and provide a critical 
analysis of current management practice and 
public policy. While many readers may take 
issue with the authors' sometimes controversial 
arguments, I recommend this volume to anyone 
who is not afraid to follow a provocative explo 
ration of the knowledge-based economy's far 
reaching implications. 
Bradford S. Bell 
Assistant Professor 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Cornell University 
Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Prom 
ise of Executive Compensation. By Lucian 
Bebchuk andjesse Fried. Cambridge, Mass. : 
Harvard University Press, 2004. xii, 279 pp. 
ISBN 0-674-01665-3, $24.95 (cloth). 
Every once in a while someone comes out 
with an important book concerning corporate 
governance or executive compensation. Like 
Aldolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means's The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1932) and Graef S. 
Crystal's In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation 
of American Executives (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1991 ), Bebchuk and Fried's new book is thought 
provoking and interesting. It is a very impor 
tant book and should be read not just by those 
interested in executive pay or corporate gover 
nance but by anyone interested in how corpora 
tions work. 
The main idea in Pay without Performance is 
that there has been a fundamental breakdown 
in how executives are paid in the United States. 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that most researchers 
of executive pay have focused on the "arm's 
length bargaining model," according to which 
CEOs report to objective, independent board 
members who, in turn, report to shareholders. 
This standard principal-agent framework has 
been used in hundreds of academic papers. 
Bebchuk and Fried argue that empirical facts 
point to a very different explanatory frame 
work?a 
"managerial power" model. 
Pay without Performance has four main parts. 
In the first part the authors describe the "offi 
cial view" of executive pay, the one most schol 
ars hold. In this view, "boards, bargaining at 
arm's length with CEOs, negotiate pay arrange 
ments designed to serve shareholders' inter 
ests." In stoutly arguing that this model is not "a 
sufficiently accurate reflection of reality," 
Bebchuk and Fried marshal a long list of consid 
erations: for example, directors seek to be re 
elected to boards; CEOs have power to benefit 
directors (and vice-versa); boards may favor 
CEOs for a variety of social and psychological 
reasons; directors' costs for favoring CEOs are 
very low; and shareholders have very limited 
power to countervail these forces. 
The second part of the book elaborates the 
"managerial power" perspective and employs it 
to 
explain the "unfulfilled promise" of execu 
tive pay. Bebchuk and Fried argue that CEOs 
use their power "to secure rents?that is, extra 
value beyond what they would obtain under 
arm's-length bargaining." Although there are 
many new reporting requirements for firms, 
managers and boards are able to "camouflage" 
executives' 
compensation. The authors cite 
evidence that CEOs are more richly paid when 
